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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal arises out of two Orders of the Third 
District Court dated July 3, 1989, and August 11, 1989. Both 
Orders granted defendant/Respondent's (hereinafter 
"Respondent") two separate Motions for Summary Judgment. This 
Court is vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide this 
Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(i) and 78-2-2(4) 
(1953, as amended), Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, and that certain Notice dated October 31, 1989, of the 
Office of Clerk, Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
These proceedings arise out of a breach of contract 
action initiated by plaintiff/appellant Lewis W. Butcher and 
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Company (collectively referred to 
herein as "Butcher") against respondent CrossLand Savings, FSB, 
formerly known as Western Savings and Loan Company, on March 4, 
1987. The trial court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on August 11, 1988, on the grounds that two of 
Butcher's claims were barred by the statute of limitations set 
forth at Utah Code Ann § 78-12-23 (1953, as amended). The 
trial court granted Respondent's second Motion for Summary 
Judgment on July 3, 1989, on the grounds that all challenged 
disbursements were properly authorized. Appeal was taken from 
these rulings on August 3, 1989. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Respondent does not dispute the Statement of Issues as 
set forth in Butcher's Brief at p.l. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
e . . The [summary] judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Section 78-12-23, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended): 
Within six-years: 
(2) an action upon any contract, 
obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing, except those 
mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with Appellants' Statement of Facts 
as set forth in their Brief dated January 16, 1990, with the 
following modifications and additions: 
1. The disbursement dates cited by Appellants are 
correct, except that the third disbursement occurred upon 
March 4, 1981, rather than March 1, 1981. 
2. On or about December 9, 1980, Appellant Lewis W. 
Butcher ("Butcher") signed a written Authorization authorizing 
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Respondent to disburse funds from his construction loan 
account. The Authorization provides: 
In connection with our loan, as captioned 
above, we hereby authorize you to make all 
checks necessary as payoffs, direct to the 
parties concerned. 
3. All of the disbursements made by defendant were 
approved by either Butcher or his designated agent and 
contractor, Jerry Willmore. The contractor's Authorizations 
for Payment and Receipts and Lien Releases may be found in the 
Record at pp. 78-94. 
4. Respondent maintained a proper Loan Disbursement 
Record, which also provides a record of regular inspections 
performed at the construction site. Other than the blanket 
Authorization, Respondent received no special instructions 
regarding the disbursement of funds. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I. The written Authorization executed by 
Butcher is clear and unambiguous. Parol evidence may not be 
admitted to vary or alter the plain language of the written 
agreement between the parties. 
ARGUMENT II. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-406 does not toll 
the commencement of the statute of limitations for breach of 
contract set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Two of 
Appellants* four claims are barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE AUTHORIZATION SIGNED BY BUTCHER IS 
UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The District Court properly determined the 
Authorization signed by Butcher was clear and unambiguous. 
After review of the Authorization and Butcher's claims, the 
court determined that the purpose of the Authorization was 
plainly set forth in the four corners of the document. No 
extrinsic evidence should be permitted to contradict or vary 
the clear language of the Authorization. 
Butcher advances two arguments on appeal. First, he 
contends that the Authorization "amends" the loan agreement 
between the parties. This argument may be dismissed for three 
reasons. 
Butcher raises this issue for the first time on 
appeal. Nowhere in the record did Butcher present to the trial 
court that the Authorization was an "amendment" or "change" to 
the other loan documents he executed contemporaneously. This 
Court may not address legal arguments raised for the first time 
on appeal. 
A second reason for denying this argument is that 
there is no evidence to support Butcher's claim that the 
Authorization is "an amendatory change to the original contract 
terms." (Appellant's Brief at p. 8.) Butcher admits all of the 
documents were signed contemporaneously. The Authorization in 
no way varies or alters the terms of the other loan documents. 
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Finally, parol evidence is only admissible in 
instances where the amendment is ambiguous or requires 
additional evidence to make its meaning clear. Clear, 
unambiguous written additions to a contract do not require 
extrinsic interpretive evidence. For example, in Abrams v. 
Financial Service Co., 13 Utah 2d 343, 374 P.2d 309 (1962), the 
amendment contradicted terms of the original agreement. No 
such contradiction exists in the instant case. 
Butcher's second argument is that the Authorization is 
inherently unclear and extrinsic evidence is required to 
interpret the "true meaning1* of the document. The trial 
court's failure, according to Butcher, to find there was an 
integrated agreement, opens the door to any extrinsic evidence 
the parties deem necessary. This argument contradicts Utah 
precedent and common sense. 
The decision to permit extrinsic or parol evidence 
begins with an examination of the written instrument. "[I]n 
delivering the intent of a contract the language of the 
instrument itself should first be looked to, and unless there 
is some ambiguity or uncertainty, there is no justification for 
attempting to vary it by extrinsic or parol evidence." 
Williams v. First Colony Life Insurance Company, 593 P.2d 534, 
536 (Utah 1979). The language of the Authorization at issue in 
the instant case is in no way unclear or ambiguous. 
Butcher claims that, despite the plan language of the 
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Authorization, he was to "retain control over all disbursements 
requested by the contractor." (R. 102.) This Court's 
acquiescence to Butcher's contention that he was to retain 
control over all disbursements would render the Authorization 
meaningless. If, as Butcher claims, the agreement required his 
authorization for each individual disbursement, there would 
have been no reason for the execution of the Authorization. 
This common sense interpretation of the Authorization 
is supported by Butcher's own actions. There were a number of 
disbursements made pursuant to this Authorization (R. 79-94). 
Butcher does not claim that all of the disbursements were 
violative of his agreement with the bank. Instead, Butcher 
seeks to selectively interpret the Authorization, in the face 
of its written terms, to suit his own ends. 
Contrary to Butcher's assertions, a court need not 
always find that a contract is integrated to exclude parol 
evidence. The Utah Supreme Court holds that only "in some 
cases, it will be necessary for a trial judge to rule on the 
issue of integration as a preliminary or foundational matter." 
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Construction, 731 P.2d 
483, 487 (Utah 1986)(emphasis added). Where an instrument is 
clear on its face, the determination of integration need not be 
made. Williams v. First Colony Life Insurance Company, 593 
P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979). 
Further, Butcher's assertions regarding the 
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Authorization and interpretation are inadmissible in any 
event. Butcher seeks to persuade the Court that Respondent was 
not authorized to disburse funds without his consent. Evidence 
which would contradict or vary the language of the 
Authorization is inadmissible. 
In Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 
646 P.2d 696 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court determined 
that parol evidence may not be used to vary the terms of an 
agreement clear in its facts. It held: 
In the instant case, plaintiff is attempting 
to prove that the original contract 
contemplated conditions not specified in the 
writing which clearly would change its 
meaning. Parol evidence may therefore not 
be admitted to show that the defendant 
"promised" to do anything other than as is 
stated on the face of the agreement. 
Id. at 698. 
Similarly, Butcher seeks to contract the clear terms of the 
Authorization through parol evidence. 
The trial court correctly found there was no genuine 
issue of material fact in this case. Butcher admits to 
executing the Authorization. The language of the Authorization 
is clear and unambiguous. The trial court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
II. BUTCHER'S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FOR TWO DISBURSEMENTS 
ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
All parties agree the statute of limitations found at 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (1953) governs this dispute. That 
statute provides in part: 
Within six years: 
(2) An action upon any contract, 
obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing, except those 
mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
All parties also agree that the statute of limitation period 
commences to run when a breach of a contract occurs. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 11.) Butcher claims, however, that this 
universal standard is suspended in any dispute between a bank 
and its depositors. Again, Butcher's argument lacks authority 
and common sense. 
The general rule, undisputed by Butcher, is that "a 
cause of action as right of action arises the moment an action 
may be maintained to enforce it, and the statute of limitations 
is then set in motion." O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 
463 P.2d 799, 800 (1970), citing Last Chance Ranch Co. v. 
Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 493, 25 P.2d 952 (1933). In a breach of 
contract case, the statute of limitations ordinarily begins to 
run when the breach occurs. Frederickson v. Knight Law 
Corporation, 667 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1983), citing M. H. Walker 
Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 988 
(1922). 
Butcher asserts four instances of breach. As the 
statute of limitations runs from the date of each asserted 
breach, his right to recover expired on February 12, 1987, and 
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February 19, 1987, for the allegedly wrongful February 12, 1981 
and February 19, 1981, disbursements. 
The novel theory forwarded by Butcher has no precedent 
in any court. Butcher asserts that the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-4-406 tolls the commencement of the limitations 
period established by § 78-12-23 for up to one year. Section 
70A-4-406 provides: 
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a 
statement of account accompanied by items 
paid in good faith in support of the debit 
entries or holds the statement and items 
pursuant to a request or instructions of its 
customer or otherwise in a reasonable manner 
makes the statement and items available to 
the customer, the customer must exercise 
reasonable care and promptness to examine 
the statement and items to discover his 
unauthorized signature or any alteration on 
an item and must notify the bank promptly 
after the discovery thereof. 
(4) Without regard to care or lack of care 
of either the customer or the bank a 
customer who does not within one year from 
the time the statement and item are made 
available to the customer discover and 
report his unauthorized signature or any 
alteration on the face or back of an item or 
does not within three years from that time 
discover and report any unauthorized 
indorsement is precluded from asserting 
against the bank such unauthorized signature 
or indorsement or such alteration. 
This attempt to join the two statutes into a seven year statute 
of limitations period is without legal basis and completely 
unsupported by the facts of this case. 
A simple review of § 70A-4-406 reflects that it 
applies to a bank customer's unauthorized signature or 
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alteration of an item charged to his account. That is not the 
gravamen of plaintiff's Complaint. Instead, Butcher has 
alleged the bank violated a contractual obligation arising out 
of certain loan payments to third parties. The tortured legal 
argument forward by Butcher is not even supported by his own 
pleadings. 
The threshold requirement of § 70A-4-406 is not even 
met. Here, there is no alteration to an "item" which triggers 
the protections and time periods of § 70A-4-406. All of the 
authorities cited by Butcher construing § 70A-4-406 involve 
forged instruments, not alleged breaches of contract, and are 
therefore inapplicable to this case. 
Butcher claims that the Utah decision of State ex rel. 
Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 668 P.2d 503 (Utah 1983), 
supports his curious marriage of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 and 
§ 70A-4-406. The Utah Supreme Court in Baker, however, 
reviewed the commencement of the limitations period for claims 
under Utah's Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-44-1, e_t seq. In Baker, the court found 
that the statutory limitations period began to run when a debt 
is due and payable. The Baker case did not in any way address 
breach of contract actions, when the commencement date arises 
at the time of breach. Further, Baker did not permit the 
"tacking" of two limitations periods as Butcher contends. 
There is simply no substantive rule of law which 
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supports Butcher's claims- The rules governing a bank's 
relations with its depositors and notification requirements do 
not encompass breach of contract actions posited by depositors. 
Finally, Butcher's own pleadings fail to support his 
curious theory. The Complaint clearly sets forth a breach of 
contract claim, not a failure to pay a debt claim. The alleged 
wrongful act arose out of a putative breach of the loan 
documents (specifically the Authorization) not any alleged 
depositor-bank relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
Butcher provided the Respondent with a specific, 
written Authorization to perform certain acts. Respondent 
performed those acts in accord with the Authorization. Now, 
almost ten years after the execution of the Authorization, 
Butcher is attempting to contradict its specific terms with 
parol evidence. The clear and unambiguous terms of the 
Authorization bar Butcher's tardy attempts. 
Further, Butcher's attempt to re-cast his pleadings 
into a new theory are futile. Butcher filed his breach of 
contract action too late to recover on two of his alleged 
claims. There is no precedent, in Utah or elsewhere, for 
Butcher's claim that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-406 extends the 
time for a filing of a breach of contract. 
The District Court's decisions in both instances were 
correct. This Court should affirm those decisions. 
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